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‘Yes Scotland’: More than a Party
Political Campaign, a National
Movement Fostering a New Active
Citizenship
‘Yes Scotland’ : au-delà de la campagne des partis, un mouvement national
appelant à un nouvel engagement des citoyens
Annie Thiec
1 At the launch of the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign in Edinburgh, on 25 May 2012, Scottish First
Minister Alex Salmond acknowledged that in order for the campaign to win the case for
independence it would have ‘to galvanise the whole community of the realm of Scotland’, and
this, he argued, could only be achieved by building the campaign ‘brick by brick, community
by community, matching and marrying the sentiment of the people with the wonders of modern
technology’.1 Adding that ‘Yes Scotland’ could find inspiration in the National Covenant2 of
1949 which had ‘galvanised the Scots to sign for a Parliament’, Alex Salmond set the target of
one  million  signatures  by  the  autumn  of  20143 to  the  ‘Independence  for  Scotland’
declaration to be posted online. Indeed he made the following claim: ‘If we achieve that,
then we shall win an independent Scotland”, although strictly speaking one million votes in
favour of independence on referendum day, out of a total of around 4 million registered
voters, would not be sufficient to win the day.
2 The ‘Independence for Scotland’ declaration carried the main argument put forward by
the  supporters  of  independence,  and  described  by  the  Scottish  First  Minister  as  ‘a
declaration of self-evident truth’, behind which all ‘Yes’ campaigners united, namely that the
people  who  lived  in  Scotland  were  best  placed  to  make  the  decisions  that  affected
Scotland.4
3 Speaking just after the First Minister, Patrick Harvie, co-convener of the Scottish Green
Party, pointed out that while many people had probably already made up their minds
about how they were going to vote in the independence referendum, the main challenge
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for the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign would be to rally the undecideds: ‘If we’re going to convince
the unconvinced, we must build a clear and compelling vision of what will be different, of what
independence is for, of how our society can change for the better’.5
4 ‘Yes Scotland’, therefore, needed to capture the imagination of Scottish voters in a way
that  the  National  Conversation  on  the  future  of  Scotland  initiated  by  the  first  SNP
Government in 2007 had not.6 In its second White Paper on the constitutional future of
Scotland,  ‘Your  Scotland  Your  Voice’,  published  in  2009,  the  Scottish  Government
congratulated itself on the National Conversation being ‘a unique programme of engagement
with the Scottish public’. Yet its own official figures7 could hardly be seen as evidence that
the objective of securing the ‘fullest participation possible’ set in the first White Paper, ‘
Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation’, had been met.8
5 The 1997 referendum was an obvious model for the Scottish Government, coming after
the victory at the British general election of a party – Labour – which had committed
itself in its election manifesto to a referendum on devolution. The devolution referendum
had indeed given the Labour Government a clear mandate to proceed with its devolution
plans. In 1997, however, the Labour Government could rely on the support of the other
two parties in favour of constitutional reform, namely the Liberal Democrats and the SNP,
all three parties campaigning alongside each other for a double ‘Yes’ vote9 in the cross-
party campaign ‘Scotland FORward’. The three parties together commanded between two
thirds and three quarters of the votes at every general election in Scotland from 1979 to
1992 and had won 80% of the votes in 1997. Besides, as opinion polls showed, the political
consensus in favour of devolution was embraced by a large majority of the people of
Scotland. 
6 By contrast, by the time the SNP won its first Scottish Parliament election and formed a
minority government in 2007, though there was a cross-party consensus on Scotland’s
constitutional future in the Scottish Parliament, it was against full independence. In fact,
until 2007 there were two pro-independence parties other than the SNP represented in
the Scottish Parliament, namely the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialist Party,
with respectively six and seven MSPs elected in 2003, but at the 2007 and 2011 Scottish
Parliament elections, the Scottish Green Party only had two candidates elected – both on
regional lists – while the Scottish Socialist Party did not manage to win a single seat.
Besides, even after the SNP’s historical victory in 2011, when the party won an overall
majority  of  seats  in  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  won  the  election  in  53  of  the  73
constituencies, support for independence did not make any progress. As shown in the
Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, a majority of people in Scotland were in favour of the
powers of the Scottish Parliament being extended, but when it came to constitutional
preferences they still opted for further devolution rather than complete independence.10
7 When the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign was launched in the spring of 2012, therefore, victory
seemed to be well beyond the reach of the three pro-independence parties. In actual fact,
the target of 1million signatures to the ‘Independence for Scotland’ declaration was
reached three and a half weeks before Referendum Day, on 22 August, but although the
‘Yes’ campaign gathered momentum in the last weeks of the official campaign and all the
opinion polls  showed the  gap between the  ‘No’  votes  and the  ‘Yes’  votes  narrowing
dramatically, the Scottish Government fell short of reaching the 50% needed to win the
case for independence. On an exceptionally high turnout – 84% of the registered voters –
55.3% said ‘No’ to Scotland becoming an independent country.
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8 Yet, in spite of the claims made by the leaders of the ‘Better Together’ campaign that the
outcome of the referendum had settled the question of Scotland’s independence once and
for all, and while the Prime Minister announced on the day following the referendum the
setting-up of an all-party commission chaired by Lord Smith and assigned the task of
producing  a  set  of  proposals  for  more  devolution  by  St  Andrew’s  Day11,  the  pro-
independence  movement  has  not  died  down  –  quite  the  reverse.  One  may  wonder
therefore to what extent ‘Yes Scotland’ could be seen as having laid the foundations for a
national movement for independence.
9 Alex Salmond received most of the attention of the media in its coverage of the ‘Yes
Scotland’  campaign from its  launch in 2012 through to  the final  days  of  the official
campaign. 12 Yet, although the First Minister remained throughout ‘the public face of the
independence campaign’, as David Torrance puts it,13 in the last weeks of a campaign in
which the pro-independence parties had to come to terms with a generally hostile media,
the Scottish Green leader established himself more firmly in the party political campaign
promoting his own vision of an independent Scotland. In actual fact, however, there were
two campaigns developing in parallel, a campaign in the media which to a large extent
was dominated by the SNP and a campaign on the ground, which involved a number of
extra-parliamentary groups set up in the wake of the 2011 SNP election victory with a
view to engaging people in the debate on what kind of society they wanted Scotland to be.
 
The SNP-led campaign
10 Great  care was taken early on to make of  ‘Yes  Scotland’  an umbrella  group rallying
political parties, non-party organisations as well as individuals supporting independence,
rather than a one-party campaign. A few weeks after the launch, Blair Jenkins, former
head of news for both BBC Scotland and STV, was appointed as Chief Executive of ‘Yes
Scotland’,14 and in August 2012 an advisory board of 10 members was appointed, half of
whom were non-party political appointments.15 The composition of the board, chaired by
former  Labour  MP  and  thereafter Independent  MSP  Dennis  Canavan,  scrupulously
respected parity between men and women. Among its political appointments were the
Deputy First  Minister,  Nicola  Sturgeon,  the co-convener  of  the Scottish Green Party,
Patrick Harvie and the convener of the Scottish Socialist Party, Colin Fox.
11 Yet, just as the ‘ScotlandFORward’ campaign in 1997 had borne the mark of the Labour
Party, regardless of the fact that both the Liberal Democrats and the SNP threw their
weight  behind  a  double  ‘Yes’  vote,  for  the  obvious reason  that  it  was  Labour  in
government in London which had decided to hold a referendum on devolution in the first
place, the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign was bound to bear the mark of the SNP. It was the SNP
government which entered into negotiations with the British government over the right
for the Scottish Government to hold a referendum on independence. It was Alex Salmond,
as  First  Minister  of  Scotland,  who signed the Edinburgh Agreement  with the British
Government on 15 October 2012 which, among other things, provided that the British
Parliament would transfer to Holyrood the power to hold a referendum on independence
before the end of 2014. And it was the Scottish Government which introduced legislation
aimed at organising the referendum before the Scottish Parliament.16
12 As was the case in 1997, when the British Government published a White Paper17 ahead of
the devolution referendum making the case for devolution, the Scottish Government also
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published a White Paper, Scotland’s Future – Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, which
was unveiled by the First Minister on 25 November 2013. In this case, however, not only
did the White Paper make the case for independence but it  also revealed in detail  a
number  of  policies  which the  SNP pledged to  implement  if  it  won the  first  general
election in  an independent  Scotland.  And although the  White  Paper  did  explain  the
difference  between  devolution  and  independence,  and  highlighted  the  gains  from
independence ‘whichever party is elected’,18 there was no doubt as to the fact that it was
above all a policy document and looked very much like an election manifesto, unlike the
British Government’s 1997 White Paper on devolution which did not mention policies.
13 The SNP undoubtedly took advantage of its position as the governing party to rally people
behind a ‘Yes’ vote thereby making the ‘Yes’ campaign appear very much as an SNP-led
campaign. The Scottish all-women Cabinet chaired by Nicola Sturgeon in Edinburgh on 9
June 2014 is a case in point. Both the format of the Cabinet meeting, which included
women from 130 organisations across Scotland, and the issues discussed on that occasion,
whether it was the Government’s commitment to free universal childcare for children
aged 1 to 519 or its proposal to raise the minimum wage,20 were clearly targeted at women,
whom  opinion  polls  had  identified  as  being  more  reluctant  to  vote  ‘Yes’  in  the
referendum. Indeed such events  enabled the SNP to campaign for  a  ‘Yes’  vote while
building on their record in government.21 
14 In many instances, therefore, the leadership of the SNP – whether Alex Salmond or Nicola
Sturgeon – seemed to be campaigning for the first election in an independent Scotland as
much as for a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum. Nowhere was this more evident than in the
televised debates between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling in August 2014,22 modeled on
the leaders’ debates first held in Britain during the 2010 general election campaign, and
also held in Scotland in the run-up to the 2011 Scottish Parliament election. These two
leaders’  debates gave a presidential tone to the campaign, turning it into an election
campaign in which voters were asked to choose between two parties to govern Scotland.
This  was  inappropriate  of  course,  but  it  was  also  hazardous,  especially  for  the  ‘Yes’
campaign as the message sent to the people was that a ‘Yes’ vote meant a vote for Alex
Salmond. 
15 While such a strategy may have paid off in the Scottish Parliament elections of 2007 and
2011,  in  the  context  of  the  referendum,  it  made the  ‘Yes’  campaign run the  risk  of
antagonizing people who might lean toward a ‘Yes’ vote but did not want to see Alex
Salmond as the Prime Minister of an independent Scotland. Indeed Survation carried out
an  all-women  poll  for  the  Daily  Record  in  which  a  sample  of  1,000  women  were
interviewed between 8 and 12 August, that is to say between the two leaders’ debates. 23
Interestingly, the poll showed that while the SNP was the most popular party among
women, support for the party leader was far from unanimous.
16 Thus, in terms of voting intentions in the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, the SNP came
first:  43% of  those  certain  to  vote  declared  that  they  intended  to  vote  for  the  SNP
candidate in the constituency vote while 36.1% said they would vote for the SNP in the
regional  vote.24 Yet,  a  majority  of  the  women  interviewed  (51.3%)  agreed  with  the
statement that Alex Salmond’s presence as leader of ‘Yes Scotland’  made them more
likely to vote ‘No’ in the referendum. In fact, 55.3% thought that Alex Salmond wanted
independence  mainly  because  he  wanted  to  be  Prime  Minister  of  an  independent
Scotland, while 44.7% thought that his motivation was that he thought independence
would  be  best  for  the  people  of  Scotland.  Lastly,  when  it  came  to  describing  Alex
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Salmond’s personality, the three most chosen adjectives were arrogant (54.6%), ambitious
(51.9%) and dishonest (29.2%).25
17 Besides, in the context of the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, the SNP leader had made
the most of scoring political points during the leaders’ debates by underlining his party’s
credentials as the most able party to defend the interests of Scotland within the United
Kingdom and above all pressing his positive vision of the future against the negativity of
his opponents. But this time the leaders’ debates were at best a zero-sum game, since
Alistair Darling outperformed Alex Salmond in the first debate, as Alex Salmond himself
admitted afterwards, while the second debate turned to his own advantage.
18 Unsurprisingly therefore, the media coverage of the ‘Yes’ campaign focused very much
on the SNP’s proposals more than on independence as one constitutional option among
others for the future of Scotland.
 
Coming to terms with a generally hostile media
19 The conventional media in Scotland was overwhelmingly opposed to independence. With
the exception of  the Sunday Herald,  which called for  a  ‘Yes’  vote,  all  other  Scottish
newspapers – or Scottish editions – at best tried to present the two sides of the case, as
did the Herald, but mostly defended the Union. Although some may at times have been
critical of the strategy developed by the ‘Better Together’ campaign, all in all they had a
definite bias against the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign, and especially against the party seen as
leading it, namely the SNP.
20 As a result of such hostility, the terms of the debate in the media were very much dictated
by the parties defending the Union, from the outset right to the end of the campaign
when, following a YouGov poll26 which gave the ‘Yes’ vote ahead of the ‘No’ vote, the
British leaders of the three pro-Union parties, just a few days before the referendum,
signed  a  joint  statement  committing  themselves  to  a  specific  timetable  for  further
devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament if people voted ‘No’.  Long before the
official campaign started, the issues which dominated the public debate were that of the
currency which would be adopted in an independent Scotland, the question of whether or
not an independent Scotland could be a member of the European Union, as well as oil and
gas  revenues  and  defence  issues,  including  the  question  of  whether  or  not  an
independent Scotland would be a member of NATO.
21 On all these issues, the ‘Yes’ campaign was shown in the media as being on the defensive
most of the time, answering questions raised or reacting to attacks launched by their
opponents against the vision they offered of an independent Scotland. As a matter of fact,
even on unpopular policies decided in London, the ‘Yes’ campaign could be seen as losing
ground, as was the case with the ‘bedroom tax’. Indeed, when the British government
announced early in February 2014 that power over housing benefit could be devolved in
the event of a ‘No’ vote, the pro-independence parties found themselves deprived of one
of their most popular arguments for independence, namely that only a ‘Yes’ vote could
protect Scotland from policies being imposed on it by a coalition government it had not
helped bring to power in London.
22 As the media chose to present a ‘Yes’ vote as expressing support for an SNP Government
in an independent Scotland, the Scottish Government found itself driven into a corner.
Thus,  when  on  12  February  2014,  in  Edinburgh,  George  Osborne,  Chancellor  of  the
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Exchequer, ruled out a currency union between an independent Scotland and the rest of
the UK, and was almost immediately backed by the Labour and the Liberal Democrat
leaders,  Alex Salmond was immediately pressed by the media to spell out his Plan B.
Beside  putting  the  SNP  on  the  defensive,  such  pressure  also  brought  to  the  fore
dissensions within the ‘Yes’ campaign over the currency issue, between supporters of the
Scottish  Government’s  strategy  of  negotiating  a  currency  union  and  advocates  of  a
separate Scottish currency, among whom Patrick Harvie, but also Dennis Canavan, Jim
Sillars  and  Colin  Fox.  Therefore  although  the  idea  of  a  currency  union  was  strictly
speaking what the SNP favoured, not what all the supporters of independence advocated,
the decision by the three pro-Union parties to rule out a currency union was presented as
exposing the weakness of the entire ‘Yes’ Campaign in a way that the differences between
the proposals for further devolution to the Scottish Parliament made by the three pro-
Union parties were never presented in the media as a weakness of the ‘No’ campaign.
23 In many ways, therefore, the ‘Yes’ campaign was presented in the media above all as a
campaign led by the Scottish Government; consequently, the referendum was presented
as  a  choice  between  accepting  and  refusing  the  political  programme  which  an  SNP
Government  would  implement  in  an  independent  Scotland  rather  than  as  a  choice
between a devolved Parliament, possibly including an extension of its powers, and a fully
independent Parliament.
24 Yet after the second leaders’ debate on 25 August, as the ‘Yes’ vote started gathering
momentum,27 a series of more conventional panel-based debates gave the Scottish Green
Party  co-convener,  Patrick  Harvie,  the  opportunity  to  voice  his  party’s  vision  of  an
independent Scotland, which differed on some points from the vision expressed by the
SNP, while also strongly making the case for a ‘Yes’ vote. In this regard, the second debate
organised by STV on 2 September in Edinburgh, where he represented ‘Yes Scotland’
alongside the Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, was emblematic of a new confidence
and maturity in the ‘Yes’ camp. What came out of this debate first of all was that the two
politicians campaigning for a ‘Yes’ vote were taking part in the debate on equal terms. In
actual fact, not only did Patrick Harvie press his vision of an independent Scotland, but he
had no qualms about expressing the divergences of opinion between his party and the
SNP  on  some  issues.  Indeed  he  used  these  differences  to  make  the  point  that  the
referendum was not a vote about getting Alex Salmond in or out of government, which,
he argued, made the case for voting ‘Yes’ in the referendum even stronger.
25 In the same way, in the debate organised by the Herald in Glasgow on 4 September,28 the
Green leader distanced himself from the SNP on the issue of oil, underlining the urgency
in opting for renewable alternatives to fossil fuel energy. In fact he described oil as ‘an
asset but also a threat’ and explained that although the Greens supported the removal of
the  Trident  submarines  from  the  Clyde  estuary,  they  did  not  want  to  see  nuclear
submarines replaced with oil extraction off the west coast of Scotland. Patrick Harvie was
also comfortable with highlighting the fact that the Green Party was in favour of an
elected  head of  state,  just as  it  did  not  want  an  independent  Scotland to  apply  for
membership of NATO.
26 In the end, the SNP, which had every legitimacy to set the agenda in the ‘Yes’ campaign
being  the  party  in  government  which  had  initiated  the  referendum,  found  itself
constrained to some extent by its belief that the positivity of the message delivered by
‘Yes Scotland’ was what would win the case for independence. Building on the strategy it
had  developed  during  the  2011  Scottish  Parliament  election  campaign,  the  SNP was
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determined to present a ‘narrative of hope’ to oppose to the negativity of the case made
by the ‘Better Together’ campaign. Consequently, much stress was laid on the idea that
the  people  who  lived  in  Scotland  were  the  best  placed  to  make  decisions  affecting
Scotland and that independence offered enormous opportunities in terms of economic
prosperity  and  social  justice,29 more  than  on  a  condemnation  of  the  Westminster
government.
27 As a result, the ‘Yes’ campaign faced a dilemma: the message had to be a positive message,
but it also needed to appeal to people inclined to vote ‘Yes’ not so much because they
adhered to the narrative presented by the SNP as because they felt that a ‘No’ vote meant
approving the Westminster set-up. In other words, it needed to make sure that people
inclined to say ‘No’ to the status quo could be persuaded to say ‘Yes’ to independence. And
in spite of all the efforts made by the ‘Yes’ campaigners on the ground to show that a ‘Yes’
vote was not a vote for the SNP, this is what came out in the media.
28 In  this  regard,  the  campaign on the  ground differed in  many ways  from the  media
campaign as it aimed at building on people’s hostility to the Westminster political set-up,
and more widely to the neo-liberal consensus in place at Westminster.
 
The national movement behind ‘Yes Scotland’: a front
against the neoliberal consensus at Westminster
29 The ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign was remarkable in that it succeeded in engaging people in
the debate about what kind of society they wanted Scotland to be, thanks, to a large
extent, to the involvement of extra-parliamentary groups campaigning on the ground
alongside party activists for a ‘Yes’ vote. These groups emerged within the left movement
in Scotland, and positioned themselves firmly to the left of the Scottish Labour Party. In
this regard,  the profusion of  publications centring on the potential  for change in an
independent Scotland bears witness both to the dynamism of the left movement and to
the  willingness  to  initiate  a  debate  not  so  much on arguments  in  favour  or  against
independence, as on different models of society. The titles of some of the books (Blossom –
What Scotland needs to Flourish, Caledonian Dreaming – The Quest for a Different Scotland, or
Common Weal – All of Us First) published in the wake of the launching of the ‘Yes Scotland’
campaign are  indeed emblematic  of  a  feeling  that  the  prospect  of  a  referendum on
independence gave the people of Scotland the opportunity to create a new nation and a
new model of society.30
30 Among the non-partisan groups aiming at laying the foundations of a true participatory,
citizen-engaging democracy one was actually created before the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign
was launched: ‘National Collective’ was founded in 2011 by a small group of artists and
writers in Edinburgh. Presenting itself as ‘the cultural movement for Scottish independence
featuring artists, writers and activists creatively campaigning for a ‘Yes’ vote through local groups,
events, social media, published word and art’, its main objective was to help ‘shape the vision of
a new society and nation’31 by providing a platform for individuals and local groups in the
independence movement.  People were therefore invited to participate in a variety of
events, from debates and talks to cultural showcases and ‘pop-up gigs’, as well as sending
their own contributions – visual or otherwise – to the National Collective website.
31 Three other extra-parliamentary groups actively campaigned on the ground for a ‘Yes’
vote, all aimed at engaging local communities across Scotland in the referendum debate
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by organising or taking part among other things in public meetings and street stalls. The
‘Radical Independence Campaign’ launched in Glasgow in November 2012 gathered trade
unionists,  socialists,  environmentalists  and anti-poverty  campaigners  whose objective
was to promote a radical, progressive vision of Scotland. ‘Women for Independence’ was
launched in September 2012 with a view to pursuing the work of the women’s groups
which in the 1990s had actively campaigned for equal representation of women in the
new Scottish Parliament.32 ‘Common Weal’ started as the flagship project of the Jimmy
Reid Foundation in June 2013 which invited people to submit ideas about how to build a
better, fairer society in an independent Scotland, and it became a separate organisation
at the beginning of August 2014. 
32 The message they wanted to get across to the people in the run-up to and during the
referendum campaign was that independence was not an end in itself, but rather it was
an opportunity to reform and radically change Scottish society so as to establish a truly
social  democracy.  Thus  Cat  Boyd and Jenny Morrison,  both  members  of  the  Radical
Independence Campaign,  and authors of  a pamphlet  entitled Scottish Independence –  a
Feminist Response, explained that the question to answer was ‘not whether Scotland should be
an  independent  country,  but  how  a  ‘Yes’  vote  could  change  the  lives  of  Scottish  women’.33
Independence was therefore a rational choice, not a nationalist one.
33 Their common aim was to build a front against the neo-liberal consensus in place at
Westminster,  which ‘Common Weal’  called the ‘Me First’  model.  The point was not so
much to convert a majority of the Scottish people to their proposals as to build on what
they saw as  having the potential  of  rallying an overwhelming majority  of  people  in
Scotland, namely ‘the unsustainable direction of British capitalism’.34 For that purpose, what
needed  to  be made  clear  to  the  electorate  in  Scotland  was  that  the  ‘No’  campaign
embodied ‘the status quo of the Westminster-style government’.35 It was therefore absolutely
essential for ‘Yes Scotland’ to ‘present a positive alternative to blackmail of Westminster-style
neoliberalism with its stark message of “there is no alternative”’.36
34 Presenting a positive alternative, however, did not preclude condemning the neo-liberal
consensus itself – quite the reverse. In this regard, Britishness was seen by the Radical
Independence Campaign as ‘the missing link in the Yes campaign’.37 In other words, it was
vital to put forward the case against the status quo as much as the case for independence.
As James Foley and Pete Ramand put it: ‘Our task in common, across the ‘Yes’ movement, is
convincing the Scots that they lose out from attachments to Britain’.38 The crucial question,
therefore, was ‘can Scotland afford to stay in Britain?’ and not ‘can Scotland afford to go it
alone?’.39 Likewise, Alan Bisset explained in an essay published in 2012 in the collection of
essays  entitled  Unstated  –  Writers  on  Scottish  Independence:  ‘For  the  Yes  campaign  to  be
successful, Scots will need to recognize in it a sense of their own grievance […]. We must talk the
language of hurt as much as the language of hope.’40 
35 It was essential therefore to build a positive message on what Scotland would lose if it
chose to stay in the United Kingdom, in an attempt at making the Scots feel less attached
to the Union. Instead of presenting the prospect of an independent Scotland exclusively
in terms of opportunities offered which would guarantee economic prosperity and social
justice,  as  the  Scottish  Government  tended  to  do  when  it  insisted  on  delivering  a
‘narrative of hope’ to counterbalance the negativity of the ‘Better Together’ campaign, it
was equally important to underline the fact that a ‘No’ vote meant more austerity and
more  cuts  in  public  services.  In  actual  fact,  this  is  a  point  which  the  ‘Radical
Independence Campaign’, as well as ‘Women for Independence’ and ‘Common Weal’ tried
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to address in the public meetings and events they organized or took part in, thereby
trying to expose the promises for further devolution made by the pro-Union parties as
being aimed at legitimizing the Westminster model of government.
36 What also made the campaign on the ground particularly invigorating and dynamic was
the  fact  that  it  combined  conventional  ways  of  campaigning,  such  as  leafleting  and
canvassing on the doorsteps, as well as traditional forms of citizen engagement through
the  town  hall  meetings,  with  the  tools  of  modern  technology.  This  undoubtedly
contributed to the sense of massive citizen engagement generated by ‘Yes Scotland’. To
take one example, National Collective launched a Twitter hashtag called ‘#YesBecause’
which encouraged people to declare themselves for independence, and which could be
used to a certain extent as a new kind of canvassing. Besides, the ‘Yes’ campaign also had
its own media in the form of the online newspaper and website Bella Caledonia, which
published  articles  aimed  at  balancing  the  bias  of  the  conventional  media  against
independence.41 Likewise, during the Edinburgh Festival, a new online television channel
appeared on the Internet which called itself Referendum TV. It was created and run by
volunteers who felt that the mainstream media were not telling the whole story in the
referendum debate, and that the mainstream broadcast media, and the BBC in particular,
could not be trusted to tell  the truth in spite of its neutrality obligation. Among the
programmes  webcast  during  the  campaign,  mostly  in  August,  were  face-to-face
interviews as well as informal debates with a variety of guests from all walks of life, not
all of them in favour of a Yes vote.42
37 When it comes to assessing the potential impact modern technologies and in particular
the social media may have had on the campaign, caution is required, however. Research
carried out by Mark Shepard and Stephen Quinlan on the role of the social media in the
referendum campaign over a period of one year from mid-August 2013 to the referendum
has established that, although online activity increased considerably on both sides of the
debate, especially in the last three weeks of the campaign, ‘Yes Scotland’ had won the
social media campaign in terms of the number of followers on its Twitter account, of the
number of likes on its Facebook page as well as of the number of comments posted on it.
Yet, although ‘Yes Scotland’ generated greater enthusiasm online than its rival, this was
not reflected in the polls43 which still showed the ‘No’ vote as being ahead of the ‘Yes’
vote. According to Stephen Quinlan, this could be explained by the fact that ‘the social
media world is one where the committed interact with each other rather than one where converts
are made’.44 Indeed, the first poll carried out by TNS after the referendum, in mid-October,
confirmed that caution was required when trying to assess the influence the social media
may have had on the outcome of the referendum: it showed indeed that only a small
percentage of  people had contributed to an online discussion (11%) compared to the
proportion of people who had watched television – 60% of the people interviewed had
watched one of the two television debates – or talked about the referendum with their
friends and family (62%).
 
Conclusion
38 When asked by Andrew Marr a few days before the referendum whether he would be
satisfied that independence was the settled will  of the people of Scotland if  the ‘Yes’
campaign won by only a few votes, Alex Salmond replied: ‘One of the great assets of the ‘Yes’
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campaign is that we tend to take the attitude that there is not so much as a ‘No’ vote in Scotland,
there are only deferred Yeses.’45
39 While such comment could be derided as a sign of arrogance, it is interesting, however,
for two reasons: first, it indicated that the SNP leader had already accepted the idea that
the outcome might be a ‘No’ vote and was looking ahead, beyond the referendum; besides,
if one considers the developments in the last days of the campaign when the leaders of
the three main British parties signed a joint statement committing themselves to further
devolution in case of a ‘No’ vote, one may wonder what proportion of the electorate may
have decided to vote ‘No’ in the end because of the pledge made by David Cameron, Nick
Clegg  and  Ed  Miliband.  Indeed  a  British  Election  Study  poll  carried  out  between 20
February  and  9  March  2014  showed  that  three  quarters  of  the  Scots wanted  more
devolution,  and  while  unsurprisingly  96%  of  the  people  who  intended  to  vote  ‘Yes’
wanted to see more powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament, even among the ‘No’
voters 57% of the people interviewed also shared that view.
40 The percentage of ‘Yes’ votes in the referendum – 44.7% – could therefore be indicative of
a breakthrough in the building up of a national movement for independence. In any case,
the fact that, within a couple of weeks of the referendum, the membership of the SNP and
that of the Scottish Green Party tripled to reach 75,000 and 6,000 respectively, while the
Scottish Socialist Party also registered an increase in membership, is evidence that the
referendum has not settled the question of Scotland’s independence. The membership
figures unveiled by both parties at the end of the year 2014 – over 93,000 members for the
SNP46 and 7,500 for the Scottish Green Party47 – confirm that the independence movement
has not lost momentum in the wake of the referendum.
41 As  a  matter  of  fact,  just  over  four  months  after  the  referendum,  the  ‘Radical
Independence Campaign’, ‘Women for Independence’ and ‘Common Weal’ have already
set  themselves  further  objectives: the  ‘Radical  Independence  Campaign’,  in  a  post-
referendum statement issued on 27 September and entitled ‘Moving Forward’, pledged to
‘act as a broad movement for change that continues to promote the idea that another Scotland is
possible’48 and  has  committed  itself  to  continuing  to  work  with  the  independence
movement. ‘Women for Independence’ have decided to turn their campaign into a formal
organization and will hold their first AGM on 14 March 2015. Meanwhile ‘Common Weal’
is looking ahead to the forthcoming 2015 general election campaign and has launched its
‘red lines campaign’ aimed at encouraging people to vote for small parties which in the
context of a ‘hung’ parliament could hold the London government to account.
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NOTES
1. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kFXj55g3yU>, accessed 22 January 2015.
2. The National Covenant was launched in October 1949 at the cross-party Scottish Convention
initiated  by  John  MacCormick  in  1942  and  aimed  at  gathering  support  for  Home  Rule.  The
Covenant  did  not  call  for  full  independence,  but  rather  for  the  establishment  of  a  Scottish
Parliament within the framework of the United Kingdom. Although the number of signatories
has been disputed, some estimates putting that number at over two million people, bearing in
mind that the population of Scotland was around 5.1 million according to the 1951 census, it was
undeniably successful as a mass petition albeit one which had little political impact .
3. The date of the referendum had not been set yet. On 10 January 2012, the British Government
launched a consultation on handing temporary powers to the Scottish Parliament to organise a
referendum on independence, the preferred date for the British Government being 2013. The
following day, however,  Alex Salmond announced that his preferred date was the autumn of
2014.
4. The text of the Declaration for Independence read as follows: 
‘I believe it is fundamentally better for us all, if decisions about Scotland’s future are taken by the people
who care most about Scotland, that is, by the people of Scotland.
Being independent means Scotland’s future will be in Scotland’s hands.
There is no doubt that Scotland has great potential. We are blessed with talent, resources and creativity. We
have the opportunity to make our nation a better place to live, for this and future generations. We can build
a greener, fairer and more prosperous society that is stronger and more successful than it is today.
I want a Scotland that speaks with her own voice and makes her own unique contribution to the world: a
Scotland that stands alongside the other nations on these isles, as an independent nation.
5. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kFXj55g3yU>, accessed 22 January 2015.
‘Yes Scotland’: More than a Party Political Campaign, a National Movement Fos...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-2 | 2015
11
6. Malcolm HARVEY & Peter LYNCH, “Inside the National Conversation: The SNP Government
and the Politics of Independence 2007-2010”, Scottish Affairs, n°80, summer 2012, pp.91-116.
7. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Your Scotland, Your Voice, November 2009, pp.5-6. The Government
claimed that more than 15,000 people had engaged in the National Conversation overall over the
two-year period: over 5,300 people had attended more than 50 National Conversation events,
more than 6,500 people had attended 130 economy-based sessions, and almost 5,000 people had
posted comments on National Conversation blogs. As for the National Conversation website it
had received 500,000 hits.
8. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation – Independence and
Responsibility in the Modern World, August 2007, p.38.
9. Two questions were put to the people of Scotland in the referendum, the first on whether they
agreed that Scotland should have a devolved parliament and the second on whether they agreed
that the Scottish Parliament should be granted tax-varying powers.
10. The percentage of people opting for independence when asked about their constitutional
preference averaged 26.5% between 2007 and 2013 never reaching the 30% mark except in 2011
with  32%  declaring  themselves  in  favour  of  full  independence.  See  Scottish  Social  Attitudes
Surveys 2007-2013.
11. In the last days of the campaign the British leaders of the three main parties involved in the
Better Together campaign signed a joint statement in which they promised that if the Scots said
‘No’ to independence, then they would deliver more powers to the Scottish Parliament.
12. David TORRANCE, “Referendum Debate: Year Two”, Scottish Affairs, n°84, summer 2013, p.21.
13. The 16-week official campaign started officially on 30 May 2014.
14. Yes Scotland opened its headquarters in Glasgow in November 2012.
15. Andrew Fairlie (renowned Scottish chef), Elaine C Smith (actress), Pat Kane (musician), Sarah-
Jane  Walls  (fitness  trainer  and  businesswoman),  Dan  MacDonald  (businessman)  and  Ellie
Koepplinger (senior pupil). The appointment of 16-year-old Ellie Koepplinger was all the more
remarkable as the question of whether or not 16-and 17-year-olds would be enfranchised for the
referendum had not yet been settled.
16. The Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Bill was introduced on 11 March 2013
and  was  passed  on  27  June  2013,  while  the  Scottish  Independence  Referendum  Bill  was
introduced on 21 March 2013 and passed on 14 November 2013.
17. SCOTTISH OFFICE, Scotland’s Parliament, Cm.3658, London: HMSO, July 1997.
18. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Scotland’s Future - Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, November
2013, p.xii.
19. Alex  Salmond  had  announced  extra  childcare  and  free  school  meals  for  all  pupils  from
Primary 1 to 3 as from January 2015.
20. Women are generally speaking more likely to be in low-paid jobs.
21. In the same way the Youth Cabinet held in Glasgow on 20 June 2014 in which over 100 young
people  were  given  the  chance  to  question  ministers  about  their  plans  for  an  independent
Scotland was clearly targeted at young voters, and especially at the 16-17 year olds who thanks to
legislation introduced by the Scottish Government were allowed to vote in the referendum.
22. The first debate was broadcast on STV on 5 August while the second was broadcast on the
BBC on 25 August.
23. Scottish Attitudes Poll (August): A Poll of Scottish Women, 14 August 2014. <survation.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Scottish-omnibus-August-Daily-Record.pdf>,  accessed  22  January
2015.
24. The Labour Party came second with respectively 26.8% and 22.9% of voting intentions.
25. When presented with the same list of adjectives, the question this time being asked about
Alistair Darling, the three most chosen words were ‘intelligent’ (42.7%), ‘principled’ (34%) and
‘arrogant’ (30.7%).
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26. A YouGov poll for the Sunday Times on 7 September showed the ‘Yes’ vote at 51% and the ‘No’
vote at 49%.
27. From a 22-point lead in the polls for the ‘No’ vote over the ‘Yes’ vote at the beginning of
August, the gap between ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ had narrowed to a 14-point lead by mid-August, and by
the end of the month it was down to a 6-point lead.
28. The  SNP was  represented  in  the  debate  by  Fiona  Hyslop,  Cabinet  Secretary  for  Culture,
Europe and External Affairs.
29. Such positivity was epitomised by the ‘Declaration of Opportunity’ made by Alex Salmond in
Arbroath on 18 August, that is to say one month before Referendum Day.
30. Lesley RIDDOCH, Blossom – What Scotland needs to Flourish, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2013; Gerry
HASSAN, Caledonian Dreaming – The Quest for a Different Scotland,  Edinburgh: Luath Press,  2014;
JIMMY REID FOUNDATION, Common Weal – All Of Us First, Glasgow: Thomson printers, 2014.
31. <Erreur ! Référence de lien hypertexte non valide. accessed 22 January 2015. 
32. Among its  founding members were Carolyn Leckie and Rosie Kane,  both former Scottish
Socialist MSPs, Natalie McGarry, member of the SNP, and Jeane Freeman, former political adviser
to Jack McConnell when he was First Minister.
33. Cat BOYD & Jenny MORRISON, Scottish Independence:  A Feminist  Response. Edinburgh:  Word
Power Books, 2014, p.8.
34. James FOLEY & Pete RAMAND, Yes – The Radical Case for Scottish Independence, London: Pluto
Press, 2014, p.123.
35. Pete  RAMOND  &  James  FOLEY,  “A  Winning  Strategy  for  Independence?”,  posted  on  the
Bellacaledonia website, 27 May 2012. <http://www.bellacaledonia.org.uk/2012/05/27/a-winning-
strategy-for-independence>, accessed 22 January 2015.
36. Ibid.
37. James FOLEY & Pete RAMAND, Yes – The Radical Case for Scottish Independence, op.cit., p.13.
38. James FOLEY & Pete RAMAND, Ibid., p.86.
39. Ibid., p.88.
40. Alan BISSET in Scott HAMES (ed), Unstated – Writers on Scottish Independence, Edinburgh: Word
Power Books, 2012, p.38.
41. Bella  Caledonia  was actually  created in  2007 as  an online newspaper  and website  whose
objective  was  to  be  different  from  the  mainstream  media  which  considered  citizens  as  the
passive recipients of information, and to encourage instead a new participatory citizenship.
42. Several  of  these debates were hosted by renowned Scottish journalists  and broadcasters,
among whom Lesley Riddoch and Iain Macwhirter,
43. Mark, SHEPHARD, “Is the ‘Yes’ Online Tsunami Finally Paying Dividends?”, posted on the
‘What Scotland Thinks’ blog, 16 September 2014. <http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/09/
yes-online-tsunami-finally-paying-dividends> accessed 22 January 2015.
44. Stephen QUINLAN, “Racing Ahead Online: Catching UP Offline?”, article posted on the ‘What
Scotland Thinks,’ blog, 21 February 2014. < http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/02/racing-
ahead-online-catching-up-offline> accessed 22 January 2015.
45. BBC ONE, The Andrew Marr Show, 14 September 2014. The polls at that stage of the campaign
predicted that the referendum result would be a very close call.
46. Figures available at the following website address: <http://www.snp.org/?q=media-centre/
news/2014/dec/new-snp-members-improve-gender-balance-party>, accessed 22 January 2015.
47. Figures  available  at  the  following  website  address:  <http://www.greenparty.org-uk/
news/2014/12/11/green-surge-green-party-polling-in-fourth-again>, accessed 22 January 2015.
48. <http://radicalindependence.org/2014/09/28/ric-statement-moving-forward/>,  accessed 22
January 2015.
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ABSTRACTS
In its coverage of the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign the media focused very much on the Scottish
National Party’s proposals for an independent Scotland, thereby presenting the ‘Yes’ campaign as
being led by the Scottish Government, rather than discuss independence as one constitutional
option among others for the future of Scotland. Yet, in spite of the claims made by the leaders of
the  ‘Better  Together’  campaign  that  the  55.3%  of  ‘No’  votes  in  the  referendum  settled  the
question of Scotland’s independence once and for all, the independence movement has not lost
momentum. This article seeks to demonstrate that although ‘Yes Scotland’ unsurprisingly bore
the mark of the SNP, the campaign on the ground, which alongside party activists involved extra-
parliamentary groups whose ambition was to engage people in a wider debate on what kind of
society they wanted Scotland to be, can be seen as having laid the foundations for a national
movement for independence.
Dans  leur  présentation  de  la  campagne  pour  le  « oui »,  les  médias  se  sont  principalement
intéressés à une analyse du projet politique du Scottish National Party, suggérant ainsi que la
campagne était dirigée par le gouvernement écossais, plus qu’ils n’ont débattu de l’indépendance
comme une option constitutionnelle parmi d’autres pour l’avenir de l’Écosse. Pourtant, même si
les chefs de file de la campagne pour le ‘Non’ (‘Better Together’) ont affirmé que le résultat du
référendum (55.3 % de « non ») avait réglé la question de l’indépendance de l’Écosse une fois pour
toutes, le mouvement pour l’indépendance n’a pas perdu de sa vigueur. Le présent article vise à
démontrer que, bien que ‘Yes Scotland’ ait porté la marque du SNP, la campagne sur le terrain,
dans  laquelle  se  sont  engagés  aux  côtés  des  partis  politiques  plusieurs  collectifs  ayant  pour
objectif d’encourager les citoyens à débattre du type de société qu’ils souhaitaient pour l’avenir,
peut  être  analysée  comme  ayant  posé  les  fondements  d’un  mouvement  national  pour
l’indépendance. 
INDEX
Keywords: ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign, SNP strategy, citizen engagement, national independence
movement
Mots-clés: campagne pour l’indépendance, stratégie du Parti national écossais, engagement
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